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Abstract 
A widely endorsed belief is that perceivers imagine their present selves using a different 
representational format than imagining their future selves (i.e., near future = first-person; distant 
future = third-person). But is this really the case? Responding to the paucity of work on this topic, 
here we considered how temporal distance influences the extent to which individuals direct their 
attention outward or inward during a brief imaginary episode. Using a non-verbal measure of visual 
perspective taking (i.e., letter-drawing task) our results confirmed the hypothesized relation 
between temporal distance and conceptions of the self. Whereas simulations of an event in the near 
future were dominated by a first-person representation of the self, this switched to a third-person 
depiction when the event was located in the distant future. Critically, this switch in vantage point 
was restricted to self-related simulations. The theoretical and practical implications of these 
findings are considered. 
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Turning I Into Me: 
 
Imagining Your Future Self 
 
 
1. Introduction 
To deal with the vicissitudes of daily life, people spend an inordinate amount of time 
imagining the future (Killingworth & Gilbert, 2010; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). These moments 
lost in inner thought are not without purpose, however. By previewing forthcoming experiences, 
mental simulation acts as a virtual platform on which behavioral selection can be appraised, 
adjusted and optimized (Boyer, 2008; Gilbert & Wilson, 2007; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007; 
Wilson & Gilbert, 2003). Whether one’s goal is to bake an apple pie, perform a clarinet solo, or 
interact effectively with a new colleague, prior mental preparation serves as an important precursor 
to doing (Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2007; Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Gilbert & Wilson, 2007; 
Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2007; Pham & Taylor, 1999; Szpunar, 2010; Taylor, Pham, Rivkin, & 
Armor, 1998). Put simply, imagining oneself in the future is an indispensable psychological tool 
(Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007). 
Given the multiple ways in which imaginary experiences can affect both brain and behavior 
(e.g., Barsalou, 1999; Christian, Miles, Fung, Best, & Macrae, 2013; Christian, Parkinson, Macrae, 
Miles, & Wheatley, 2015; Libby & Eibach, 2011; Libby, Shaeffer, Eibach, & Slemmer, 2007; 
Libby, Valenti, Hines, & Eibach, 2014; Macrae et al., 2014; Macrae, Sunder Raj, Best, Christian, & 
Miles, 2013; Miles, Christian, Masilamani, Volpi, & Macrae, 2014; Moulton & Kosslyn, 2009), an 
important question arises — how exactly is the self represented during bouts of prospection? In 
tackling this issue, conventional wisdom is unequivocal. According to both theories of action 
identification and temporal construal (Liberman & Trope, 2008; Trope & Liberman, 2003; 
Vallacher & Wegner, 1985), forthcoming events (e.g., going on vacation) can be represented in 
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either a super- or subordinate manner — what matters is when the event is scheduled to occur (e.g., 
next week vs. next year).  
Construal-Level theory (CLT, Trope & Liberman, 2003, 2010) contends that whereas 
impending events (e.g., a trip to Rome) tend to be characterized in a concrete, detail-rich manner 
(e.g., locating one’s passport, reading restaurant reviews, packing), distant events comprise abstract, 
decontextualized representations that convey only the gist or general meaning of an experience (e.g., 
enjoying a weekend break with friends). In other words, as events become temporally distant, 
representations increase in schematic content. Presaging the principles of CLT, Vallacher and 
Wegner’s (1985) Action Identification theory asserts that not all goals and action plans are 
represented in the same way. Whereas superordinate (i.e., abstract) representations center on the 
overarching purpose of an action (i.e., why the action occurred; e.g., securing one’s house), 
subordinate (i.e., concrete) characterizations focus instead on the specific means through which an 
action can be realized (i.e., how the action is performed; e.g., locking the door). Integrating these 
theoretical perspectives, research has confirmed that temporal distance shifts the representational 
specificity of action goals (Christian et al., 2013; Liberman & Trope, 1998).  
Critically, distinct phenomenological representations of the self are also believed to 
accompany these differences in event/goal specificity (Liberman, Trope, McCrea, & Sherman, 
2007; Updegraff, Emanual, Suh, & Gallagher, 2010; Updegraff & Suh, 2007). Specifically, mental 
imagery is characterized by a switch from actor- (i.e., first-person perspective, ‘view the world 
through your own eyes’) to observer-based (i.e., third-person perspective, ‘seeing oneself from an 
outside perspective’) representations when simulations shift from events in the near to distant future 
(e.g., Libby & Eibach, 2011; Pronin & Ross, 2006; Trope & Liberman, 2003, 2010). Despite 
widespread endorsement of this putative relation between temporal distance and visual imagery 
perspective, supporting empirical evidence is scant. In the only direct investigation of this issue, 
Pronin and Ross (2006, Expt. 4) required participants to imagine a meal at different points in the 
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future (e.g., tomorrow vs. when aged over 40) and then probed the perspective from which the 
event was simulated using verbal descriptions of first- and third-person visual experiences (for 
related research, see Wakslak, Nussbaum, Liberman, & Trope, 2008). As predicted, mental imagery 
was more observer-like (i.e., third-person) for a meal in the distant than near future (Trope & 
Liberman, 2003, 2010). On closer inspection, however, a dominant imagery perspective only 
emerged for the near-future event. Specifically, whereas an impending meal triggered 
predominantly first-person imagery (i.e., 13 out of 15 participants), this tendency was eliminated 
when the event was slated to occur in the distant future (i.e., first-person = 8 participants; third-
person = 9 participants). Thus, it has yet to be established that distant events elicit third-person (vs. 
first-person) imagery.  
Pronin and Ross’s (2006) findings are important for at least a couple of reasons. First, they 
resonate with studies exploring vantage-point differences in the recollection of events from the near 
and distant past (e.g., D’Argembeau, Comblain, & Van der Linden, 2003; Nigro & Neisser, 1983; 
Frank & Gilovich, 1989; Libby & Eibach, 2002; Lorenz & Neisser, 1985; Robinson & Swanson, 
1993; Vasquez & Buehler, 2007). Second, albeit with a small sample, they provide preliminary 
evidence that temporal distance influences the dominant perspective from which prior imaginary 
episodes are reported, at least with respect to near-future events. It is worth noting, however, that 
this demonstration relies on an explicit verbal measure to ascertain the vantage point adopted during 
mental imagery. Although such measures have a long history in psychological research (Morin, 
2011), emphasis has also fallen on identifying indirect ways of probing differences in self-
awareness (e.g., Eichstaedt & Silvia, 2003; Haas, 1984; Wegner & Giuliano, 1980). These 
techniques are valuable as they have the potential to tap aspects of the self that are unavailable to 
conscious inspection and circumvent the problems associated with self-reports (Duval & Wicklund, 
1972). Accordingly, we used one such measure in the current investigation to explore the effects of 
temporal distance on the vantage point adopted during future-related mental imagery. 
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1.1 The Current Research 
Numerous theorists have advanced the idea that self-consciousness intensifies when 
individuals view the self from the standpoint of an external observer1 (Cooley, 1902; Duval & 
Wicklund, 1972; Mead, 1934; Piaget, 1926; Wicklund, 1975). Piaget (1926), for example, asserted 
that egocentrism is diminished when people shift attention from the external world and focus 
instead on the self from the vantage point of others, a switch in attentional orientation that captures 
the influential distinction between two fundamental facets of the self: ‘I’ and ‘me’ (i.e., self-as-
agent/knower vs. self-as-object/known; see Cooley, 1902; James, 1890; Mead, 1934). Of assistance 
to the current inquiry, three decades ago Haas (1984) devised an ingenious methodology to reveal 
these contrasting conceptions of the self. Requesting participants to draw the letter ‘E’ on their 
foreheads, Hass noted that when attention was directed toward the self (i.e., self as ‘me’), 
participants adopted an external viewpoint and drew a letter that was oriented appropriately for the 
perspective of an observer (i.e., backward for self). In contrast, when attention was directed outward 
(i.e., self as ‘I’), participants produced a letter ‘E’ that was oriented correctly for the self (i.e., 
backward for an observer). What this demonstrates is that actions near the face can reveal the 
vantage point from which events are generated in the mind (see Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, & 
Gruenfeld, 2006).  
Adopting a modified version of this letter-writing task, here we considered how temporal 
distance alters the representation of the self during a brief episode of future-related mental imagery 
(Pronin & Ross, 2006). While imagining walking along a beach in either the near or distant future 
(Liberman & Trope, 2008; Trope & Liberman, 2003), participants were required to draw the letter 
‘C’ just in front of their forehead. We expected the temporal locus of future imagery to influence 
the visual perspective from which the event was viewed (Libby & Eibach, 2011). Specifically, 
                                                        
1 Importantly, the target of observation serves as a key determinant. Adopting an observer perspective of 
oneself inflates self-directed attention, whereas mentally observing another individual has no bearing on 
one’s own self-awareness. 
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replicating and extending Pronin and Ross (2006), whereas the near event should be experienced 
from a first-person vantage point (i.e., self as I), the corresponding distant version should trigger 
predominantly third-person imagery (i.e., self as me). To establish that this switch in vantage point 
is restricted to simulations of the self, additional participants imagined their best friend walking 
along a beach (near vs. distant future) then performed the letter-writing task. Although mentally 
observing another person relies on third-person imagery (see Christian et al., 2015 for discussion), 
these images are naturally conjured from one’s own vantage point such that only the other person 
(not the self) is visible in the mind’s eye. As such, we expected participants to respond 
egocentrically (i.e., produce a letter ‘C’ that is oriented correctly for self) regardless of temporal 
distance when simulating another person.  
 
2. Method 
2.1 Participants and Design 
 One hundred and sixty members of the general public took part in the research (90 women, 
70 men; mean age = 27.17, SD = 9.49). The study had a 2 (Target: self or best friend) X 2 
(Temporal Distance: near or far) between-participants design.2  
 
2.2 Stimulus Materials and Procedure 
 Participants were approached by an experimenter in quiet, indoor locations in which they 
were alone (e.g., library, apartment) and asked if they were willing to take part in a study exploring 
mental imagery. Once permission had been obtained, participants were informed they would be 
                                                        
2 A between-participants design was used as knowledge of the forthcoming letter-writing task in within-
participants design may impede the natural course of mental imagery. Adoption of this design is consistent 
with prior research using this task (Galinsky et al., 2006). Neither the gender composition (i.e., self-near = 22 
women, 18 men; self-far = 22 women, 18 men; friend-near = 23 women, 17 men; friend-far = 23 women, 17 
men; G2 (4) = 0.1, n.s.) nor age of participants (i.e., self-near = 27.0 (9.25); self-far = 28.83 (11.32); friend-
near = 26.33 (7.28); friend-far = 26.53 (9.81), all F’s < 1, n.s.) varied as a function of experimental condition. 
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required to engage in a brief period of mental imagery (i.e., a beach walk) during which time they 
would be required to perform a simple action with their dominant hand. They were told this action 
should be performed as quickly and thoughtlessly as possible. Once the instructions were fully 
understood, participants were directed to close their eyes and to imagine themselves or their best 
friend walking along a beach either tomorrow (i.e., near future) or in 10 years time (i.e., far future).3 
After 20 seconds had elapsed (but still imagining the beach walk), participants were instructed to 
draw the letter ‘C’ just in front of their forehead (i.e., without touching the skin), using the index 
finger on their dominant hand (Haas, 1984).4 The experimenter noted the orientation in which the 
letter was written (i.e., first-person or third-person) and signaled the end of the study. Participants 
were then thanked, debriefed and dismissed.  
 
3. Results 
The results of a log-linear analysis examining the effects of Target (i.e., self or friend) and 
Temporal Distance (i.e., near of far) on the Vantage Point adopted during visual imagery (i.e., first-
person or third-person) revealed a significant effect of Target x Temporal Distance x Vantage Point, 
G2 (4) = 11.73, p = .025 (see Figure 1). Whereas simulations of self in the near future (i.e., 
tomorrow) were dominated by first-person imagery, this switched to third-person imagery when the 
event was located in the distant (i.e., in 10 years time) future. No such switch in vantage point was 
observed when best friend was the target of prospection; instead first-person imagery was preferred 
regardless of temporal distance.  
 
                                                        
3 Ten years was selected for the distant-future event as previous research has shown this interval to trigger 
abstract construal (Christian et al., 2013). 
4 The procedure was modified in this way as the sensorimotor feedback involved in touching one’s forehead 
may trigger a first-person orientation regardless of the perspective adopted during mental simulation 
(Petkova, Khoshnevis, & Ehrsson, 2011). Prior research has shown that the letter-writing task is not 
impacted by the handedness of participants (Galinsky et al., 2006; Haas, 1984).      
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Figure 1. Vantage point adopted during mental imagery as a function of target and temporal 
distance. 
 
 
4. General Discussion 
Exploring the structural characteristics of mental imagery using a non-verbal measure of self 
awareness (Haas, 1984), here we showed that temporal distance alters the vantage point that is 
naturally adopted during a brief imaginary episode (Christian et al., 2013), but only when self was 
the target of interest. Whereas simulations of a beach walk in the immediate future were dominated 
by a first-person representation of the self, this switched to a third-person depiction when the event 
was scheduled to occur at a much later date (Libby & Eibach, 2011; Pronin & Ross, 2006). In 
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contrast, when one’s best friend was the simulated target, first-person imagery predominated 
regardless of the timing of the walk5.  
These findings are noteworthy given the assumption that temporal locus (i.e., near vs. far) 
influences how future events are constructed in the mind (Trope & Liberman, 2003). Elsewhere, 
researchers have demonstrated that temporal distance shapes core aspects of self-representation. 
Confirming the tenets of action identification theory and CLT (Liberman & Trope, 2008; Trope & 
Liberman, 2010; Vallacher & Wegner, 1985), conceptions of the self in the distant future are more 
abstract and structured than those in the here and now (Freitas, Salovey, & Liberman, 2001; Heller, 
Stephan, Kifer, & Sedikides, 2011; Wakslak et al., 2008). For example, compared with the near-
future self, the distant self incorporates more superordinate identities and is characterized by less 
complexity and greater cross-situational consistency (Wakslak et al., 2008). In addition, more 
observer-like attributions are offered for the behavior of one’s future than current self (Pronin, 
Olivola, & Kennedy, 2008; Pronin & Ross, 2006). Extending these findings, this temporal shift in 
level of construal also affects the visual perspective from which the self is viewed during 
prospection. Here we showed that shifts from concrete construal (i.e., near future) to abstract 
construal (i.e., distant future) influence the vantage point (i.e., first-person vs. third-person) through 
which future events are viewed (Pronin & Ross, 2006). 
Notwithstanding the observed preference for third-person imagery when simulating self in 
the distant-future, 40% of participants continued to adopt an egocentric vantage point when 
contemplating a beach walk in 10 year’s time. This then raises an interesting question, how stable 
are the vantage points adopted during future-oriented thought (Trope & Liberman, 2010)? Related 
findings from the memory literature suggest that although people routinely switch between first- 
and third-person imagery during event retrieval (Rice & Rubin, 2011), individual or cultural 
                                                        
5 This suggests that participants imagined the event from their own visual perspective rather than adopting 
their friend’s vantage point (e.g., stepped into their shoes). Because Haas’s (1984) measure captures viewing 
oneself from an outside perspective, we can conclude that temporal distance does not influence the self-
perspective adopted when simulating another person.  
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differences in cognitive processing styles favor one perspective over the other (Cohen, Hoshino-
Browne, & Leung, 2007; Libby & Eibach, 2011; Nigro & Neisser, 1983). Echoing this viewpoint, 
Christian et al. (2013) have recently shown that sociocultural differences in conceptions of the self 
(i.e., individualistic vs. collectivist, see Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002; Triandis, 1989) 
influence the vantage point adopted during mental imagery. In particular, whereas Western (i.e., 
individualistic) participants report adopting first-person imagery during prospection, residents from 
Eastern (i.e., collectivist) nations tend to favor a third-person visual perspective. It remains to be 
seen, however, whether comparable effects would emerge on indirect (i.e., non self-report) 
measures of visual perspective and events that occur at different points in the future. In terms of the 
structural characteristics of self-construal (e.g., concrete vs. abstract), a useful task will be to 
explore how cultural forces and temporal considerations shape both the process and products of 
prospection (Wilson & Gilbert, 2003). 
Future research should also direct attention to the temporal distances traveled during mental 
simulation and the contents of the associated imaginary experiences (Liberman & Trope, 2008; 
Trope & Liberman, 2010). If, as reported in the current investigation, increasing temporal distance 
triggers a switch in self-construal from first- to third-person representations, it would be interesting 
to establish when exactly this switch occurs. Inspection of the available literature reveals ambiguity 
around when in the future an event is considered to be distant (i.e., from a few months to over 20 
years; see Christian et al., 2013; Pronin & Ross, 2006; Waklslak et al., 2008). Given the 
implications of self-construal for a range of psychological outcomes (e.g., affective forecasts, task 
completion times), it will be important to establish when and for whom shifts in imagery 
perspective take place. Similarly, through the use of questionnaires and thought-listing techniques 
(e.g., Marks, 1973; McIsaac & Eich, 2002), consideration should also be given to the contents of 
mental imagery during prospection (see Christian et al., 2015). One prediction of CLT is that 
imagery should be richer and more detailed for events in the near than distant future (Liberman & 
Trope, 2008; Trope & Liberman, 2010). However, quite how the vividness of imaginary 
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experiences relates to the vantage point adopted during prospection requires further investigation 
and clarification.       
Aside from obvious theoretical significance, vantage-point differences in visual imagery 
also have important practical implications for a raft of everyday phenomena (e.g., Libby & Eibach, 
2011; Libby et al., 2007; Macrae et al., 2013, 2014; Miles et al., 2014). For example, spontaneous 
differences in the visual perspective adopted during mental imagery (i.e., first-person vs. third-
person) may contribute to errant views of one’s future self (Libby & Eibach, 2011). According to an 
extensive literature on affective forecasting, people make inaccurate judgments about their future 
selves because they focus too closely on target events and fail to consider other factors that shape 
their behavior and reactions (e.g., Gilbert & Wilson, 2007; Wilson & Gilbert, 2003). Adoption of a 
third-person vantage point for the simulation of distant events may exacerbate this tendency. 
Stripped of experiential detail and comprising simplified schematic representations (Christian et al., 
2015; Wakslak et al., 2008), third-person simulations provide only an abstract synopsis of future 
events; it is therefore little wonder that people’s judgments go awry. Switching to a first-person 
vantage point, at least for certain types of forecast, may remedy this situation (Libby & Eibach, 
2011). Future research should explore this possibility. 
 While potentially leading emotional predictions astray (Wilson & Gilbert, 2003), there are 
nevertheless occasions on which adoption of a third-person vantage point is the optimal way to 
preview the future (Buehler, Griffin, Lam, & Deslauriers, 2012; Libby & Eibach, 2011). For 
example, a lack of experiential detail is beneficial when unpleasant or undesirable events are the to-
be-imagined episodes. Simulating a life-threatening scenario can leave a residue of negative affect 
long after the imaginary episode has ended (Sutherland & Harrell, 1986; Roberts & Weerts, 1982). 
In addition, visceral reactions to imaginary events have the capacity to fuel the symptoms of a range 
of psychological disorders, including anxiety, social phobia, and PTSD (see Holmes & Mathews, 
2010). One way to minimize these reactions, however, is to distance one’s self from disagreeable or 
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stressful events through the adoption of a third-person vantage point during mental imagery (Kross, 
2009; Williams & Moulds, 2008).  
Taking distancing to an extreme, it has been suggested that people sometimes consider their 
future self like a stranger, making self-relevant judgments and decisions much as they would for 
another person (e.g., Pronin et al., 2008; Pronin & Ross, 2006; Wakslak et al., 2008). What this 
suggests is that when self-relevant episodes are simulated from a third-person vantage point (e.g., 
distant-future events), the imagined version of the self may be stripped of the experiential 
components that produce the corporeal feeling of personal identity, hence blurring the boundary 
between the self and others (Hershfield, 2011; Mitchell, Schirmer, Ames, & Gilbert, 2011; Pronin 
& Ross, 2006). In this way, shifts in vantage point have important implications for the temporal 
continuity of self. Connectedness with future me depends on the extent to which conceptions of 
one’s current and future self are deemed to be similar (Parfit, 1971, 1987). As such, if distant 
simulations trigger adoption of third-person (cf. first-person) imagery in which similarity is reduced, 
this likely exerts considerable influence on a raft of judgments and behaviors in the here and now 
(Hershfield, 2011).           
 
5. Conclusions 
Exploring the natural properties of mental imagery, here we demonstrated that temporal 
projection is characterized by natural shifts in visual perspective (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Pronin 
& Ross, 2006; Wicklund, 1975). When simulating an event in the distant future, participants adopt 
an experiential vantage point in which they view themselves from an outside perspective (i.e., third-
person perspective). In contrast, first-person imagery (i.e., actor perspective) dominates the 
simulation of a near-future event. These shifts in vantage point — hence self-awareness — likely 
serve a pivotal function in social cognition, the precise nature of which has yet to be elucidated 
(Libby & Eibach, 2011). What is apparent, however, is that important insights into this 
phenomenon can be garnered from a simple drawing task. As Haas (1984, p. 797) observed, 
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“Drawing letters on one’s forehead is not a behavior that is important in its own right. But it may be 
a useful technique for studying those various aspects of perspective taking that have served as the 
ground beneath many psychological theories.”     
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